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Abstract. The DNS structure discloses useful information about the
organization and the operation of an enterprise network, which can be
used for designing attacks as well as monitoring domains supporting
malicious activities. Thus, this paper introduces a new method for ex-
ploring the DNS domains. Although our previous work described a tool
to generate existing DNS names accurately in order to probe a domain
automatically, the approach is extended by leveraging semantic analysis
of domain names. In particular, the semantic distributional similarity
and relatedness of sub-domains are considered as well as sequential pat-
terns. The evaluation shows that the discovery is highly improved while
the overhead remains low, comparing with non semantic DNS probing
tools including ours and others.
1 Introduction
DNS (Domain Name System) [15] is critical for the well functioning of Internet
as it is mainly used for locating a host in the Internet based on a human read-
able name. Service availability is improved by dynamic reallocation to another
machine without changing the DNS name. However, this mechanism is also em-
ployed by attackers to improve the robustness and the efficiency of the attacks
[18]. Hence, DNS has recently gained interest from the security community and
especially the naming scheme for discovering malware hosting domains [18].
This paper focuses on DNS probing, i.e. guessing domains that are in use.
This is an alternative to IP address scanning, which is fastidious and quite visible
whereas DNS requests go through intermediate DNS servers, which hide the at-
tackers. An attacker commonly uses dictionaries to probe existing domain names
and aims to discover the networking organization, as well as potential vulnera-
ble hosts. A common example is to check the hostnames of common services like
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) or SSH (Secure Shell) by probing domains such as
ftp.example.com. In [10], the authors show that DNS scanning allow to identify
potentially vulnerable IPv6 addresses quicker than with a classical random IP
scanning due to the large address space, they apply this technique to ease the
spread of worms in IPv6 Internet.
Thus, penetration testing and security assessment are based on an initial re-
con by discovering subdomains and hosts. With a proper DNS configuration, this
cannot be gathered directly and therefore requires brute-forcing. In this paper,
the DNS brute forcing tool is semantically extended since we have observed that
human based names usually follow semantic schemes. This includes the word
semantic as well as numerical semantics (series of numbers) of DNS names.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents DNS. An overview of
the semantic exploration system and SDBF (Smart DNS Brute-Forcer) [21] is
given in section 3. Semantic extensions are covered in section 4. Our approach
is assessed in section 5. Related work is presented in section 6 and conclusions
are drawn in section 7.
2 DNS Background
To keep the paper self-contained, this is a short overview of DNS, but the reader
may read [16, 15, 17] for further explanation.
The main objective of DNS is to provide a map between human readable
and remainable names to IP addresses. The organization of DNS is hierarchi-
cal with a root server at the top and dedicated authoritative servers for each
subdomain. Assuming the domain name www.uni.lu, lu is the top level domain
(TLD) which is the parent of all .lu subdomains (second level domain) includ-
ing uni.lu. The third level domain is www.uni.lu. When a user needs the IP
address of www.uni.lu, the first step is to query a recursive DNS server, usu-
ally maintained by his operator. This server is responsible to find the host by
iteratively querying the authoritative servers of the subdomains. So, it starts by
asking a root server which replies back with the DNS server in charge of the lu
domain. The recursive DNS server of the client can also contact it to know, which
server is in charge of uni.lu. Finally, when uni.lu is queried, it returns the IP
address of www.uni.lu, which is then forwarded to the client by the recursive
server.
DNS messages are mainly composed of Resource Records (RRs), which refers
to different types of resolution. For the most common one the type is A or AAAA
for getting the IPv4 or IPv6 address corresponding to a domain name. PTR are
defined to enable inverse resolution (IP address to name).
A DNS name uses a dotted format to separate several components, i.e. a
sequence of labels. In this paper, labeli refers to the i
th component, starting
from the right. Thus, the top level domain is defined by label0. For example,
www.uni.lu has three labels: label0 = lu, label1 = uni, label2 = www. Even if
a recent extension allows non-ASCII characters [7], this paper doesn’t consider
them, as most of domains are still composed only of ASCII characters.
3 Exploration of DNS
3.1 System Overview
Our approach aims to automatically discover DNS names, and in particular,
some subdomains of a domain by generating labels. Assuming a domain d, most
of the current techniques rely on testing labels sequentially, l, stored in a dictio-
nary (www, ns, ftp, smtp, etc. but also atlanta, boston, host, etc.) by concate-
nating the label l with the domain d to form a new subdomain l.d. In this paper,
our prior tool SDBF [21] is used to generate new names after a learning stage.
Samples are required to learn how valid labels of domain names look like. They
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Fig. 1. System overview
are collected through a passive DNS platform [22], which consists in monitoring
and storing requests sent and replies received by a recursive DNS server. In our
case, only valid names i.e. with valid DNS replies, are stored in a database.
Two key ideas have emerged from observations we made during our personal
experience, as well as by mining the passive DNS database:
– subdomains of the same domain are semantically related, in particular end
hosts. For example, using planets, cities, countries, or character names of
cartoons is a frequent habit of network administrators,
– a domain may present sequential patterns. For example, enumeration is a
standard naming convention within a company or a university that leads to
hostnames like room1-pc1, room1-pc2, room2-pc1, ns1, ns2, etc.
As shown in figure 1, the two main steps for discovering the DNS names are:
– the construction of an initial list of names using SDBF [21] (2) or a dictionary
based-approach (3’)
– the extension of that list by exploiting the semantics of names (5)-(8)
3.2 SDBF
Features The main features in SDBF are based on linguistic parameters. We
assume an input list (1) of DNS names N = {n1, ..., nP }, a set of DNS label
levels L = {l1, ..., lS}, a set of used characters C = {c1, ..., cM} and a set of
n-grams, Gx = {x1, ..., xT }.
The statistical features include: #wlenn - the number of DNS names with
n labels, #wleni,j - the number of labels of the i
th level (with i ∈ L) having
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j characters, #firstchari,j - the number of labels at the i
th level (with i ∈ L)
starting with character j ∈ C and #ngrami,j,k - the number of times that a
character j ∈ C is succeeded by k ∈ C at the ith level with i ∈ L.
These features are transformed into distributions as follows ((2) in figure 1):
– the distribution for domain lengths (in label levels):
distwlen(X = j) =
#wlenj∑
k #wlenk
(1)
– the distribution of the lengths of labels (in number of characters) for a given
level l:
distwlenl(X = j) =
#wlenl,j∑
k #wlenl,k
(2)
– the distribution of the first characters of labels for a given level l:
distfirstcharl(X = j) =
#firstcharl,j∑
k #firstcharl,k
(3)
– the N-gram distribution for a certain level l and a character c is given by:
ngraml,c(X = i) =
#ngraml,c,i∑
k ngraml,c,k
(4)
N-gram Model: N-grams [14] are successive character sequences of length n
∈ N, extracted from a string. For example, an n-gram with n = 2 is called
bigram. Consider the following DNS name, test.uni.lu, bigrams can be: te,
es, st, un, ni, lu... For generating the names of labels, the different esti-
mated distributions are applied to a Markov chain. A Markov chain is defined
for each label level, l, as a set of states S={s1,s2,...,sr} representing the char-
acters that have been observed at this level. The probability of the transition
between the two nodes representing by the two characters ci and cj is equivalent
to ngraml,ci(X = cj). By applying k steps, this model allows to generate a label
of k characters.
An example for the n-gram model Markov chain is given in figure 2. This
means, the probability that a character ‘u‘ is followed by character ‘n‘ is 0.4 and
the probability that an ‘i‘ is followed by another ‘i‘ is only 0.2.
Name generation: Once the system is trained, SDBF can generate new names
to probe, by first defining how long the new name should be in terms of number of
labels. To achieve this, a random number following the distribution of number of
labels, (distwlen), is generated. As SDBF is designed to be highly customizable,
this value can also be set by the user. The same process is applied to determine
the length of labels in characters for each label l to generate: distwlenl. Again,
the user can set the value. Finally, for a label with a length k, the first character
will be generated following the distribution of the first characters corresponding
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to the label level, distfirstcharl, and the remaining k−1 characters are generated
by applying the Markov Chain.
As the Markov chain is limited to a fixed set of transition, some transitions
are not possible. For instance, if the bigram “sn” was never observed, the word
“snt” could not be generated. To strengthen the discovery, we consider that a
transition between any two pairs of characters is possible with a probility . For
this, the other tansitions probabilities are slightly decreased to keep the sum of
probabilities for outgoing transitions equal to one.
Because it is common usage to scan a domain, the user can set fixed parts
for a domain. For example, the objective may be fixed to discover all domains
following the *.uni.lu or ns.*.lu or www.*.*.
Once names are generated, (3) in figure 1, their existence is checked by the
name checker (4), which makes a DNS query. This formally corresponds to a
function valid(D) returning the valid domains of a set D.
4 Semantic extension
As illustrated in figure 1, the semantic module takes as input a list of names,
where the validity has been checked (5). The goal is to extend this list of dis-
covered names by analyzing individual labels. There are two modules, DISCO
and the incremental module that can be used individually or combined together,
whereas the splitter module is an optional preprocessing step.
4.1 Similar names
The first semantic extension aims to discover names that are similar or related.
These are distinct notions[4]. Similarity refers to words having a close meaning
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(for example, notebook and laptop). Semantic relatedness refers to words shar-
ing the same semantic field like mars and venus, which are different planets. As
claimed by Kilgraff et. al [11], these usual notions impliy a manual analysis to es-
tablish relationships between words that limits its applicability and its extension
to further language or semantic domain.
In this paper, we leverage DISCO (extracting DIStributionally related words
using CO-occurrences) [12], which is based on an efficient and accurate method
for approximating automatically (based on leanring samples) these two notions
within one metric, called the similarity afterwards. DISCO considers the dis-
tance between two words within a window by defining ||w, r, w′||, the number of
times the word w′ occur after r words after the word w, where −3 ≤ r ≤ 3. For
example, table 1 represents windows centered on services. The window is mov-
ing along all the database samples to compute the counting that is transformed
into frequencies, i.e. f(w, r, w′), by dividing by the total number of counted
co-occurences for any ||w, r, w′||.
Intuitively, two words w1 and w2 are considered similar, if both of them
have many co-occurrences with the same words, in particular, if the positions
the latter regarding w1 and w2 are similar. DISCO uses the following definition,
initially proposed in [13]:
sim(w1, w2) =
∑
(r,w)∈T (w1)∩T (w2) I(w1, r, w) + I(w2, r, w)∑
(r,w)∈T (w1) I(w1, r, w) +
∑
(r,w)∈T (w2) I(w2, r, w)
(5)
where I(w, r, w′) is the mutual information between w and w′ [9] and T (w) all
the pairs (r, w′) where I(w, r, w′) is positive.
Assuming a domain d including the label l, the objective is to find similar
labels l′. The exploration goes into two directions. The first one is the horizon-
tal exploration, which may be adjusted by limh. This corresponds to select the
most limh similar words from DISCO. This result is set into a new set of labels
ExplH(l, limh) which are tested by the Name Checker (figure 1) by concatenat-
ing with unmodified labels (other levels). By this, a new set is obtained, denoted
by V alid(ExplH(l, limh)).
The second exploration examines the vertical dimension by looking for addi-
tional similar names starting from this new set. The limit of the vertical explo-
position -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
sample 1 a client uses services of the platform
sample 2 the platform provides services to the client
||services,−3, a|| = 1 ||services,−3, the|| = 1
||services,−2, client|| = 1 ||services,−2, platform|| = 1
||services,−1, uses|| = 1 ||services,−1, provides|| = 1
||services, 1, of || = 1 ||services, 1, to|| = 1
||services,2,the|| = 2 ||services, 3, client|| = 1
||services, 3, platform|| = 1
Table 1. Example of co-occurrence counting (2 windows centered on services)
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ration is set by limv and is defined by repeating the previous process limv times
with new discovered valid names:
ExplV (l, limv) =

∅ if limv = 0⋃
l′∈ExplH(l,limh) V alid(ExplH(l
′, limH)) if limv = 1⋃
l′∈ExplV (l,limv−1) V alid(ExplH(l
′, limH)) otherwise
(6)
In order to reduce the search space only validated labels are considered for
further extensions, as noticed by the use of V alid in the equation (6). The vertical
exploration stops once no new correct labels are found. So, limv does not need
to be manually set, which improves the easy use of our tool.
The vertical exploration is actually recursive and highlighted in figure 1 by
the loop (5)-(6)-(7)-(8). Figure 3 represents a subset of a real probing by starting
from the label surf, the horizontal exploration reveals unsuccessful (surfing,
skate) and successful (rugby, soccer...) labels. Then, the vertical exploration
entails a horizontal extension for each of the latter.
4.2 Incremental discovery
In many cases, machines and services are replicated and/or respect a systematic
naming scheme as for example pc1, pc2, etc. Assuming that one of them has been
discovered, the others can be generated by finding out the numerical components
and using the following heuristic: test all possible values (including ) for each
individual digit. This limits the exploration to a number of the same or of smaller
power of ten (0 to 9 will in the previous example). Preliminary experiments have
shown that increasing the search range to bigger numbers does not improve the
results while, the overhead highly increases.
4.3 Splitter
Labels of DNS names can be composed of several words like linuxserver or
linux-server. Applying DISCO on such names cannot provide any results since
it performs over single words. Therefore, the labels have to be divided automat-
ically in advance. Using a list of separating characters, as for instance “-” is too
restricted and our tools refer to the word segmentation method described in [20].
The process is recursive by successively dividing the label in 2 parts, to find the
best combination, i.e. with the maximum probability, of the first word and the
remaining part. Therefore, a label l is divided in 2 parts for each position i and
the probability is computed:
P (l, i) = Pword(pre(l, i))P (post(l, i)) (7)
where pre(l, i) returns the substring of l composed of the first i characters and
sub(l, i) of the remaining part. Pword(w) returns the probability of having the
word W equivalent to its frequency in a database of text samples.
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Additionally, the splitter modules can also discover the incremental part of
a domain. A label like computer23 is split as computer and 23 which is helpful
for the first step of the incremental process (see previous subsection). This may
also detect non numerical increments, as observed in our database (servera,
serverb, etc.), which can be incremented afterwards using ASCII codes.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Methodology
Assuming a domain d, dictionary based techniques probe by iterating over a set of
labels, l, to form the hostname l.d. In the current evaluation, SDBF is configured
similarly and two dictionary-based tools are also tested: Fierce 1 and DNSenum
2. Both are included in Backtrack [1], a Linux distribution designed for digital
forensics and penetration testing. The dictionary from Fierce includes only 1 895
words, whereas the one from DNSenum includes 266 930 entries. Hence, SDBF
was configured to generate as many labels as DNSenum. The reader should refer
to [21] for an evaluation of these tools without semantic extension. The main
result is that SDBF and Fierce provide the best results, but all of them are
complementary, i.e. they do not find the same names.
Based on the discovered names, new ones are probed using the semantic
extensions with one of the following strategies:
– Similar names (DISCO)
– Similar names (DISCO) + Splitter
– Similar names (DISCO) + Splitter + Incremental discovery
Except if mentioned, the last one is applied. The original databases provided
with the semantic tools [12, 20], like Wikipedia 3, are used to train them.
The targeted domains in our experiment are extracted from the top 50 web-
sites ranked by Alexa (www.alexa.com), where only 19 domains have been se-
lected such as google.com, ebay.com, baidu.com... This selection discards do-
mains performing wildcarding i.e. these domains will always respond positively
to DNS requests regardless of the query. Furthermore, similar domains with dif-
ferent TLD have also been discarded, since hostname results are similar in this
case. For example, google has no less than twelve domain names with different
TLDs in the top 50 Alexa. We also choose five popular domains from Luxem-
bourg including the one of our university (uni.lu) which is probed from internal
network. All these domains are presented in figure 5.
5.2 Main metrics
In our experimental evaluation we consider Initi with i ∈ {SDBF,DNSenum,F ierce},
the initial list of discovered domains for each tool and we also define:
Initoverall = InitSDBF ∪ InitDNSenum ∪ InitFierce (8)
1 http://ha.ckers.org/fierce/
2 http://code.google.com/p/dnsenum/
3 http://www.wikipedia.org
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(a) Horizontal exploration (b) Vertical exploration
Fig. 4. Vertical and horizontal depth analysis (average overall domain)
For the evaluation, we presentNewi with i ∈ {SDBF,DNSenum,F ierce, overall}
the set of new discovered domains thanks to every initial dataset Initi. Assuming
|S| as the cardinality of a set S, the improvement is defined as:
%Impi =
|Newi|
|Initi| , i ∈ {SDBF,DNSenum,F ierce, overall} (9)
It represents the percentage of new discovered names regarding to the initial
dataset. A significant value of %Impi shows that our method is able to find
new hostnames which previous methods have not found, even when they are
combined.
5.3 Exploration Parameters
Horizontal search: The horizontal search may be configured by adjusting
limh, which limits the exploration to the top limh similar words, as noticed
in section 4. On the one hand, we can assume that the more words we have
and test, the more hostnames we find. On the other hand, each DNS request
is expensive in time and this may lead to the detection of the DNS probe.
Figure 4(a) represents the evolution of the hostname discovery regarding limh,
which varies between 1 and 200. The plotted metric, ImpHi,h represents the
proportion of new discovered names when limh = h compared to limh − 1.
Assuming %Impi,h, the value of %Impi when limh = h, we define:
ImpHi,h =
{
%Impi,h if h = 1
%Impi,h −%Impi,h−1 otherwise (10)
Figure 4(a) shows that having an exploration limit higher than 40 words does
not significantly improve the results. That is why we set limh to 40 but, in case
a deep domain investigation is required, by increasing it, it can still discover
new names, as the curves are still positive. Besides, performances are equivalent,
whatever the initial tool is.
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(a) Percentage (%Impi) of newly discov-
ered hostnames
(b) Number (|Newi|) of newly discovered
hostnames
Fig. 5. Efficiency of semantic exploration
Vertical search: As our probing method is based on previous discovered host-
names, we can launch it over new hostnames, gathered by the different process
iterations. This number of performed probes is called the vertical depth and
fixed through limv. The process also stops once no new generated names are
valid (see section 4). In our case, this leads to a maximal number of 5 iterations.
Figure 4(b) represents the ratio of discovered names compared to the maximum
(limV = 5). Between 55 and 80 % of the domain names are found in the first
iteration and more than 95 % before the fourth one, so we can reasonably limit
the probe to three iterations.
5.4 Gain evaluation
Figure 5 shows the result of our probe, made on 24 domain names using DISCO
with the previously tuned parameters. Regarding the individual improvements,
in many cases the number of discovered hostnames is doubled (%imp > 100)
or even more. For instance with the original dataset from SDBF, the number
of names related to domains, as go.com, msn.com or google.com, is increased
by more than 100 %, moreover for ebay.com, we reach an improvement of more
than 200 % for both, SDBF- and Fierce-based intialization. Similar results can
be observed for DNSenum and the mean improvement over the 24 domains is
between 84% and 102% as shown in Table 2.
Furthermore, this tool provides a real solution to discover new hostnames
that existing solutions are unable to find, even if all the three other tools are
combined (overall in table 2). For instance, a global improvement of 55% for
ebay.com, 51% for google.com or 30% on the overall domains set is observed.
This proves the usefulness and accuracy of semantic exploration as the most
common hostnames have already been discovered by one of the initial tools
(SDBF, Fierce or DNSenum). From a domain name such as mars.pt.lu, merkur.pt.lu
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SDBF Fierce DNSenum Overall
Domains |Init| |New| %Imp |Init| |New| %Imp |Init| |New| %Imp |Init| |New| %Imp
livejasmin.com 24 39 162 20 14 70 18 14 77 37 33 89
ebay.com 123 284 230 115 257 223 185 225 121 284 158 55
google.com 69 125 181 84 87 103 83 108 130 149 77 51
vdl.lu 15 15 100 11 13 118 16 12 75 23 11 47
amazon.com 78 82 105 55 72 130 75 75 100 132 52 39
msn.com 207 281 135 196 246 125 236 223 94 372 140 37
baidu.com 369 243 65 178 280 157 238 253 106 478 157 32
microsoft.com 115 121 105 91 90 98 97 98 101 189 56 29
apple.com 141 128 90 65 116 178 130 106 81 241 70 29
ask.com 88 82 93 78 65 83 79 71 89 135 40 29
all domains 2057 1739 84 1520 1558 102 1788 1565 87 3170 954 30
Table 2. Probing results – top 10 and over all domains
Fig. 6. Efficiency of the different semantic
extension when initialized with SDBF
Fig. 7. Number of probes per domain to
discover |Newi|
and jupiter.pt.lu have been found or from kangaroo.apple.com, we discover
camel.apple.com, porcupine.apple.com and piglet.apple.com. Our first as-
sumption deduced from observations that hostnames are attributed by human
and by this, a semantic relation exists between hostnames, proves correct.
5.5 Strategy evaluation
As introduced in section 5.1, different strategies are tested by combing DISCO
(SN - similar names), the splitter and the incremental modules. Figure 6 shows
the efficiency of each startegy initialized with SDBF. We clearly see that Sim-
ilar Names leads to discover the main part of new DNS names, as curves of
other strategies mainly coincide with the one from Similar Names. The second
observation is that Splitter provides few signs of improvement to Similar Names
and Incremental Discovery (ID) brings some results, especially for the domain
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(a) Number of probes made per domain in
the initial dataset
(b) Number of newly discovered host-
names per probe
Fig. 8. Ratio of probes due to each individual module
livejasmin.com. In fact through this method, the hostname news10.livejasmin.com
leads to discover 31 new hosts (newsX with X ∈ {1; 9} ∪ {11; 32}).
Therefore, the strategy has to be carefully chosen. For fast probing of many
domains, only the DISCO based extension should be used, but if the objective
is to probe deeply one domain, all of them have to be combined, since each of
them may improve the results.
5.6 Overhead
The overhead is defined as the number of additional DNS requests (#probes).
As previously mentioned, SDBF and DNSenum require more than 250 000 DNS
probes to produce their results. In Figure 7, we can observe that our method
always needs to perform less than 100 000 DNS requests, but this discovery is
based on a list established by a prior tool. The biggest probes are made for
the biggest initial datasets (ebay.com, msn.com, baidu.com) but, half of the
domains require less than 20 000 probes. Figure 8(a) shows that the Similar
names module has a quite steady ratio of probes per initial name (between
200 and 500 requests). The efficiency of this module, as we can see in figure
8(b), is also steady, it discovers around 1 domain name for 200 probes. Other
modules perform less requests than the previous one, as we can see in figure 8(a),
but figure 8(b) shows that applying Splitter is less efficient than Similar names,
whereas Incremental discovery needs to perform very few probes to discover new
domains.
These results show that our method is far less expensive than initial ones (at
least 4 times for SDBF or DNSenum) for approximatively discovering the same
number of domain names (section 5.4). As a basis the Similar names module
should be used, which provides the steadiest results although, the efficiency of
the other tools is dependent of the targeted domain.
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6 Related work
In DNS research, major works deal with the detection of DNS attacks as for
example, fast-flux, spamming, anomalies in DNS traces,... and present mots var-
ious defensive measures for these threats. Statistical evaluation is used in [2],
respectively whitelists and classifiers are referred to, to detect anomalous pat-
terns in RR data for rervealing poisoning attacks. The authors in [3] describe a
large-scale passive DNS tool, where features are used to detect anomalies, as for
example euclidean distances between entries to identify changes in the lifetimes
of domains, etc. In [18], suspicious flux networks are detected by passively cap-
turing DNS traffic. The data evaluation is based on the Jaccard index, similar to
[8]. To classify the services, the authors refer to supervised learning, where the
C4.5 algorithm is used to separate malicious flux and benign services. In [19],
the authors perform analysis and visualization of DNS traffic in different modes,
off-line, near-real-time and real-time by combining aggregation to clustering. In
[6], the authors show that regular expressions improve filtering capabilities for
malicious domain detection and provide more accurate results than black-lists.
In this paper, a more semantic approach is used to explore domains in the
Net. Natural language processing (NLP) techniques emerged in the research
areas of forensics and security. In [5], an automatic domain name generator is
constructed by combining different NLP techniques, as for example by using a
syllable to construct new passwords or usernames. A major difference to this
work is, in [5] full words are generated. By using different statistical tools, as
Kulback-Leibler divergence or Levenshtein edit distances, domain names related
to botnets can be detected [24]. In the same context of generating new passwords
is the work presented in [23]. Here, a new approach relying on probabilistic
context-free grammar is used to generate rules in order to crack passwords.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, DNS brute forcing tools are enhanced by using semantics, i.e. the
average improvement is higher than 80%. When combined with SDBF, the tool
only needs a passive DNS database and a set of text samples like Wikipedia.
Hence, it may easily be applied and it can be continuously reinforced since the
previous databases are continuously evolving. Depending on the context, this
paper has assessed the benefit of different strategies, as well as the implied
overhead. Future work will deal with distributed probing.
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